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In most states, K-12 teachers receive tenure after serving a probationary period of several years.  
Teachers with tenure, or a continuing contract, are guaranteed due process before they can be 
dismissed from their job.  I use a restricted use version of the 2007 Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) to estimate the effect of tenure on teacher behavior and time allocation at school and 
outside of school.  Estimates are obtained by exploiting the cross-state variation in the 
probationary period length of novice teachers within a difference-in-difference framework.  I 
find that in the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly more of their 
own money on classroom materials.  Relative to the tenure evaluation year, once teachers receive 
tenure, they communicate less with students and parents outside of class and participate less in 
school and district committees.  In those districts where at least one probationary teacher is fired, 
I find that teachers reallocate their teaching time.  Immediately after receiving tenure, they spend 
less time teaching math and more time teaching English. 
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1 Introduction 
In most public school districts, teacher tenure is a time-honored element of teacher 
employment contracts.  However, several states have recently introduced legislation to modify or 
eliminate teacher tenure.  In 2011, the state of Florida passed a bill that any new teacher hired 
would receive a year-to-year contract, effectively eliminating tenure.  In 2009, Ohio extended the 
probationary period before a teacher is eligible for tenure from three years to seven years.  
Proponents of tenure argue that once teachers demonstrate competency during a probationary 
time period, they should be protected from arbitrary dismissal.  Opponents of tenure argue that 
the process of firing poor performing teachers is too time-consuming and expensive.  Once a 
teacher receives tenure, school districts must follow a detailed and costly sequence of steps to 
fire a poor performing tenured teacher.  As a consequence, few tenured teachers are fired for 
poor performance in the United States.  For example, from 2004 – 2008 Chicago Public Schools 
only formally dismissed 9 tenured teachers, or 0.01 percent of its workforce.  Prior to receiving 
tenure, school districts can fire, or fail to renew the contract, of a probationary teacher for almost 
any reason – with the exception of discriminatory or other illegal reasons.  Because tenure status 
increases a teacher’s job security by reducing the likelihood of being fired, I investigate how 
teachers anticipate and respond to receiving tenure. 
In particular, I look at how teacher work hours and specific-subject teaching hours vary 
once a teacher is granted tenure.  I also look at the change in a teacher’s spending on classroom 
materials and explore whether teachers change their time allocation in activities outside of the 
classroom (e.g. club sponsorship, coaching, serving on school committees, etc.).  Finally, I 
consider how teachers respond in districts where at least one probationary teacher’s contract was 
not renewed in the previous year.  That is, I examine if a differential response exists in districts 
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where tenure evaluation standards may be more stringent or more strongly enforced.   To answer 
these questions, I use data from the 2007-2008 restricted use version of the Schools and Staffing 
Survey (SASS) and exploit the cross-state variation in the probationary period length of novice 
teachers.  The majority of states require that teachers serve for three years in a district before 
tenure is granted.  However, several states have shorter probationary periods of two years while 
others have longer periods of four or even five years.  I use a difference-in-difference 
methodology to investigate the changes in teacher behavior in the year immediately following 
receipt of tenure.  
Teacher tenure is a specific application of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
which consists of the laws and regulations that govern the hiring and firing of workers.  Once a 
teacher is granted tenure, dismissal or firing costs increase considerably.  There is a sizable 
economics literature on the effects of EPL on various outcomes of interest.  Autor et al. (2007) 
found that the adoption of wrongful discharge protection laws in the United States altered firms’ 
production choices, causing employers to retain unproductive workers and subsequently reduced 
technical efficiency.  Blanchard and Portugal (2001) found that the strict employment protection 
in Portugal profoundly affected the labor market relative to the United States and led to an 
increased duration of unemployment.  Heckman and Pagés (2000) showed that job security 
legislation in Latin America reduced employment and increased wage inequality across workers.  
Several other papers also found that EPL affects worker employment (Martins, 2009; Kugler and 
Saint-Paul, 2004; Miles, 2000; Lazear, 1990). 
There are also papers that investigate the impact of EPL on individual worker behavior.  
Ichino and Riphahn (2005) used data from a large Italian bank and found that employee 
absenteeism increased significantly once employees were no longer under a probationary period.  
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Scoppa (2010) used the 1990 EPL reform act in Italy to investigate the effect on worker 
absenteeism in that country.  Using a difference-in-difference approach, the author exploited the 
fact that the law drastically increased the firing costs for small firms, and found that shirking 
increased once employees were granted firing protection.  Despite this extensive literature, there 
is little research that looks at EPL in the context of K-12 education.  Jacob (2011) used the 2004 
new collective bargaining agreement in Chicago Public Schools (CPS) that gave principals the 
flexibility to dismiss probationary teachers for any reason, and found that annual teacher 
absences were reduced by roughly 10 percent.  Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) examine the 
implications of using value-added models as a criterion for granting tenure to teachers.  The 
Widget Effect, published by The New Teacher Project, documents the relationship between 
tenure and the number of teachers who are fired.  While not specifically addressing teacher 
tenure, Hansen (2009) used North Carolina administrative data and found that teacher absences 
increased dramatically in the year prior to teacher retirement or departure.   
I find that in the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly more 
of their own money on classroom materials.  Relative to the tenure evaluation year, once teachers 
receive tenure, they communicate less with students and parents outside of class and participate 
less in school and district committees.  In those districts where at least one probationary teacher 
is fired, I find that teachers reallocate their teaching time.  Immediately after receiving tenure, 
they spend less time teaching math and more time teaching English.     
 
2 State Variation in Teacher Tenure 
 The history of teacher tenure in the United States began in 1909 when New Jersey was 
the first state to pass comprehensive tenure legislation for K-12 teachers.   By the 1940s, seventy 
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percent of teachers were covered by tenure protection; and today, nearly every state has passed 
legislation granting some form of tenure.  In order to receive tenure, new teachers in a school 
district must serve for a probationary period – typically for three years.  In some states, tenure 
status is also called a continuing contract or permanent employment status.  Regardless of its 
name, tenure is a series of steps or due process that must be followed in order to dismiss a 
tenured teacher.  Under certain circumstances, it can take several years and hundreds of 
thousands of dollars before a teacher can be fired.  A spokeswoman for the New York City 
Department of Education claimed that the cost to fire one incompetent teacher in its jurisdiction 
is $250,000.    
Proponents of tenure claim that it is necessary to protect teachers from unfair and/or 
discriminatory firing.  Opponents argue that tenure protects ineffective or even incompetent 
teachers.  According to data from the 2007-2008 SASS, only two percent of teachers in the 
United States were dismissed or failed to have their contract renewed.  Table 1 shows the wide 
variation in dismissal rates across states.  South Dakota removed almost 12 percent of its 
teachers for poor performance while Arkansas removed only 0.2 percent.
1
  In some school 
districts, that number is even lower.   In The Widget Effect, the researchers found that from 2005 
– 2008, Denver Public Schools did not fire any school teachers for poor performance.   
                                                     
1
 I tested whether the variation in firing percentages across states generated heterogeneity in 
teacher response.  However, I could find no significant difference between states which fire a 
relatively higher percentage of teachers relative to those which fire a relatively lower percentage 
of teachers.  This lack of heterogeneity could be due to the fact that outside of South Dakota and 
Alaska, every state fired less than four percent of teachers for poor performance.  The sample 
size in these two states is not large enough to make any definitive conclusions. 
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Table 2 shows the probationary period that each teacher was required to serve before 
receiving tenure in 2008.  While the state passes legislation to provide the scope or limitations of 
the tenure application process, the details are often left to individual school districts.  For 
example, with over one million students, New York City is the largest, and arguably, the highest-
profile school system in the United States.  Over the last several years, considerable attention has 
been devoted to the consequences of the tenure system in New York, and so I will provide a brief 
overview of tenure in New York. 
New York state law requires that teachers be granted tenure after a majority vote of the 
board of cooperative educational services upon the recommendation of the district 
superintendent.   The district superintendent must write a report to the board of cooperative 
educational services indicating that the teacher is “competent, efficient and satisfactory.”  The 
law further states that teachers shall not be removed except for any of the following causes, after 
a hearing: “(a) Insubordination,  immoral character or conduct unbecoming a teacher; (b) 
Inefficiency, incompetency, physical or mental disability or neglect of duty; or (c) Failure to 
maintain certification as required by this chapter and by the regulations of the commissioner.” 
The state of New York requires that the district superintendent write a recommendation 
in order for a teacher to receive tenure.  There is no rubric or requirement that teachers meet 
student achievement benchmarks or undergo a certain number of observations from a principal 
or third-party observer.  In the 2010-2011 school year however, New York City introduced more 
stringent requirements in order for teachers to achieve tenure.  Teachers are now rated under a 
four-point scale that must incorporate student test scores, classroom observations, and parental 
feedback (the previous rating system only measured two levels – unsatisfactory and satisfactory).  
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The number of teachers who were denied tenure outright increased from 1 percent in 2006 to 3 
percent in 2011.  
Incorporating student performance in the tenure decision is rare at the state level.  During 
the 2007-2008 school year, only two states, Iowa and New Mexico, required that student 
academic performance be considered in awarding teacher tenure.  Even in those states, student 
performance is not the predominant criterion for awarding tenure.  Because states leave tenure 
decisions to the discretion of the local school district, I also investigate to what extent student 
performance, specifically student growth, is discussed in school district contracts as a 
requirement for teacher tenure.  Out of the 50 largest school districts in the United States, only 
three districts specifically require teachers to demonstrate student growth prior to being awarded 
tenure.    
From this evidence, it appears that few teachers on probation are denied tenure.  In The 
Widget Effect, the researchers find that in five of the six school districts they studied, less than 
one percent of probationary teachers were denied tenure.  Included among these five districts 
was Chicago Public Schools which refused tenure to only 0.1 percent of probationary teachers.  
While this dismissal rate is a ten-fold increase from the 0.01 percent dismissal rate of tenured 
teachers, it is still a low number. 
   
3 Data 
Details on state tenure laws come from the 2007 National Council on Teacher Quality 
(NCTQ) State Teacher Policy Yearbook.  In the yearbook, NCTQ publishes each state’s 
probationary period before a teacher may be granted tenure, as well as a citation for the relevant 
state law.  In addition, prior to publication of the yearbook, the organization provides state 
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officials with a draft copy of its findings in order to check the accuracy of its claims.  Because 
some laws were written to permit school district administrators to have authority over teacher 
tenure under special circumstances, at times, discretion must be used to code a state’s 
probationary period into a numerical value.   For example, the state of Maryland has a 
probationary period of two years, but it may be extended to three years on an individual basis.  
NCTQ decided to code Maryland as having a two-year probationary period.  In the four states 
where NCTQ notes that there are potentially different interpretations, I follow NCTQ’s coding 
scheme.   
I match the 2007 NCTQ data to teacher response data from the restricted-use version of 
the 2007-2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), conducted by the National Center for 
Education Statistics.  Begun in 1987, the SASS is fielded every three to four years and surveys a 
stratified random sample of public schools, private schools, and schools funded by the Bureau of 
Indian Education (BIE).   The SASS collects data on teacher, administrator, and school 
characteristics, as well as school programs and general conditions in schools.  In addition to 
restricting the sample to public school teachers only, teachers who indicated that they received 
no salary or did not work full time were dropped from the analysis.  Teachers from career or 
vocational schools, alternative schools, and special education schools were also removed from 
the sample.  Because I am only interested in looking at teacher behavior around tenure, I remove 
teachers who have been teaching for 8 or more years.   Table 3 provides summary statistics for 
the 2007 SASS.   
Because the empirical results rely on a difference-in-difference methodology, I divide the 
dataset into states with two, three, and four year probationary periods.  The combined sample 
contains 27,260 observations.  There are slight differences in teacher characteristics across the 
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different probationary period states.  The states with a two year probationary period have 
teachers that are slightly older and less likely to be white.  These same states have higher 
student-teacher ratios and a higher percentage of teachers covered under a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Teachers in these states also spend larger amounts of their own money on classroom 
materials.  These differences are likely driven by the geographic nature of the two year 
probationary period states.  These states include: California, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, South 
Carolina, Vermont, and Washington.  Most of these states are located on the coast and have 
higher costs of living.  Because of these differences across states, I run a robustness check which 
restricts the data to particular probationary period states.   
The last column in Table 3 describes overall characteristics of the teaching labor force in 
the 2007 SASS.  Teaching is a female-dominated profession with more than three-quarters of all 
teachers being female.  Approximately three-fifths of teachers work in a district with a 
collective-bargaining agreement.  Teachers are asked to provide the total amount of hours spent 
on all teaching and school-related activities during a typical full week and the average for this 
variable is 53 hours per week.  This self-reported number of work hours is higher than what is 
found in other well-known datasets like the CPS; however, the SASS prompts the teacher to 
include hours spent during the school day, before and after school, and on the weekends.  The 
SASS also asks elementary teachers how many hours a week they spend teaching the following 
four subjects: English, math, social science, and science.  Elementary teachers only spend about 
21 hours on average, or 40% of their work week actually teaching the material for these subjects.   
Teachers indicate that they spend about $425 of their own money on average on 
classroom supplies.  The fact that teachers spend their own money in the classroom is so 
common that the IRS allows a tax deduction for these purchases called the Educator Expense 
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Deduction.  Teachers can deduct up to $250 of any unreimbursed expenses incurred for books, 
supplies, computer equipment, and other supplementary materials.    In addition, I look at teacher 
participation in school extra-curricular activities as a measure of teacher devotion.  
Approximately fifteen percent of teachers coach a sport at the school they teach; and one-third of 
teachers sponsor a school club.  Over one-half of teachers indicate that they serve on a school or 
district wide committee, while only ten percent serve as a curriculum specialist.   
In order  for tenure to alter behavior, teachers must have flexibility to make changes 
around school and extracurricular activities.  In the SASS teachers are asked, “How many hours 
are you required to work to receive base pay during a typical full week at this school?”  On 
average, school districts require teachers to work 38 hours a week.  Since teachers indicate that 
they spend 53 hours on all teaching-related activities, there is still considerable flexibility for 
teachers to reduce participation rates in extracurricular activities.  Likewise, if teachers are 
required to participate in professional development activities, teacher tenure could not affect any 
changes in professional development participation rates.  While states do require teachers to 
participate in some form of professional development to maintain their certification, there is 
often a time window in which to complete these activities.  For example, the state of Ohio 
requires a teacher to complete 18 continuing education units over a 5 year time period in order to 
maintain certification.  Because a teacher has flexibility around scheduling these units, the 
possibility of strategic behavior in response to teacher tenure exists. 
 
4 Empirical Methodology  
To estimate the effects of teacher tenure on effort, I use a difference-in-difference model 
to exploit the cross-state variation in the time required for a teacher to earn tenure.  I exclude 
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Washington DC from the data since there is no required probationary period specified in the 
employment contract.  I also exclude Hawaii, Mississippi, and North Dakota, three states that 
have a one year probationary period, because I cannot disentangle whether the changes in teacher 
outcomes are from tenure or from the unique challenges of first year teaching.  Within the 
remaining forty-seven states, I use the observations in the first year after a teacher receives 
tenure as the treatment group in the model.  The control group consists of teachers who are in the 
same year of teaching as the treatment group but have not yet received tenure because of the 
state’s longer probationary period.  I use this estimation method because simply comparing the 
differences in outcomes before and after tenure may be confounded by other factors that drive 
these differences.  For example, teachers with one more year of experience may not need as 
much time to teach the material effectively.  There could also be changes in expectations around 
school service activities for more experienced teachers.  For these and other reasons, using states 
with a longer probationary period controls for the differences in teacher behavior that are not 
related to teacher tenure.   
 Table 4 illustrates the identification strategy by looking at the change in classroom 
expenditures across different years of teaching and different probationary period states.  The first 
and second columns of Table 4 report expenditures in the third and fourth year of teaching, 
respectively.  The first row of Table 4 reports classroom expenditures for states with a 3 year 
probationary period.  The second row of Table 4 reports classroom expenditures for states with 
either a 4 or 5 year probationary period.  In longer probationary period states, a teacher’s 
personal spending on classroom materials does not noticeably change between the third and 
fourth year of teaching.  However, in the states with a 3 year probationary period, there is a 
decline of over $80 in the fourth year of teaching (i.e. the first year that a teacher receives 
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tenure).  The basic difference-in-difference estimate shows a statistically significant decline of 
$110 in classroom expenditures. 
Figure 1 provides a visual description of the identification strategy by plotting the amount 
of unreimbursed money that teachers spend on classroom materials by the length of a state’s 
probationary period.  For the states with either a two or three year probationary period, Figure 1 
clearly shows a “spike” in classroom expenditures in the year that a teacher is being evaluated 
for tenure.  Teachers in two year probationary period states spend more than $100 of their own 
money in that year relative to the previous year or following year.  This sharp increase in 
expenditures in the year of tenure evaluation motivates the following empirical specification.   
For the empirical analysis, I estimate the following equation – 
 
Yidst = β0+BeforeTenureEvalidstβ1+1YrTenureidstβ2+2PlusYrTenureidstβ3+Xidst β4 + μs + υt + εidst      (1) 
 
where Yidst  is the outcome of interest for teacher i, in school district d, in state s, in teaching year, 
t.  BeforeTenureEval is a dummy variable indicating if the teacher is in a year prior to the tenure 
evaluation year.  1YrTenure is a dummy variable indicating if a teacher is in the first year of 
teaching with tenure, 2PlusYrsTenure is a dummy variable indicating if a teacher has two or 
more years of teaching with tenure, Xidst is a vector of individual and district characteristics, μs 
are state effects, υt  are teaching year effects, and εids is an idiosyncratic error term.
2
  Coefficients 
on the three tenure dummy variables are interpreted relative to the tenure evaluation year. 
                                                     
2
 Individual and school district controls include: teacher age, teacher race, teacher sex, the 
student-teacher ratio, district expenditures per student, and whether or not the district has a 
collective bargaining agreement.   
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Section 2 described how the details of teacher tenure can vary widely by state.  Teachers 
may respond differently during the tenure evaluation year in a state where the process of firing a 
teacher is more time consuming and costly in one state relative to another state.  For this 
empirical specification however, I do not distinguish between different aspects of tenure.    
Future research could look at how differences in due process affect teacher behavior.  The 
requirements of achieving tenure are relatively similar across the states.  During the 2007-2008 
school year, only two states, Iowa and New Mexico, officially incorporated student test scores 
into the tenure decision.  As a robustness check, I calculate the estimates after these two states 
are dropped from the data. 
Another potential concern is how to address the tenure status of veteran teachers who 
transfer school districts.  There are a few examples where states have made it easier for veteran 
teachers to acquire tenure after transferring school districts.  For example, in 2011 Illinois passed 
SB7 which allows previously tenured teachers who earned either a “Proficient” or “Excellent” 
rating to be eligible for tenure in 2 years if they earned an “Excellent” rating in each of the first 
two years in the new district.  A new teacher in Illinois would be on probation for four years, 
rather than two.  With the limitations of the data, I cannot calculate whether or not this type of 
condition would be applicable for a teacher in the dataset.  Therefore, I treat all teachers as under 
the same tenure laws as specified in the NCTQ dataset.  Including potentially tenured teachers in 
my estimation strategy would bias my results towards zero.   
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5 Results 
5.1 Key Findings 
The difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of teacher tenure on classroom 
expenditures is reported in column 1 of Table 5.  Relative to the tenure evaluation year, teachers 
spend approximately $70 less on classroom materials in the years leading up to the evaluation.  
Likewise, they also spend approximately $70 less in the first year of receiving tenure.  This 
amount reflects a 17 percent decline from the average of $425 spent on classroom materials.  The 
coefficient of $71 on the Tenure Evaluation Year dummy in Column 2 of Table 5 clearly shows 
the spike in expenditures in the tenure evaluation year.  Column 3 of Table 5 shows the results 
using a simplified difference-in-difference specification with only using dummy variables for the 
first year of tenure as well as for two or more years with tenure.  Relative to teachers without 
tenure, teachers in the first year of tenure spend $72 less on classroom expenditures.  However, 
even though the coefficient on the “Two or More Years with Tenure” dummy is negative, it is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the immediate drop in classroom expenditures may be 
temporary.  Teachers may feel that they need to “take a break” after the tenure evaluation year, 
but behavior reverts back to trend after a one year pause.  Column 4 of Table 5, which presents 
the baseline specification without any teacher or district controls, shows that the decline in 
classroom expenditures is not driven by changes in teacher or district characteristics.  Regardless 
of whether teachers spend their own money as an investment in their students’ academic 
performance or as a signal of commitment, teachers appear to perceive the return on their money 
to decline immediately after tenure.   
Table 6 shows the effect of teacher tenure on other measures of teacher effort.  While 
there is no decline in overall work hours, I find that immediately after receiving tenure, teachers 
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are 1 percentage point less likely to pursue any form of professional development.  Since 99 
percent of teachers are already participating in some form of professional development, the 
magnitude on this estimate is not particularly large.  Teachers are also asked if they communicate 
with students or parents outside of the classroom using any of the following: email, online 
bulletin board, course or teacher web page, blog, or instant messaging.  In column 3 of Table 6, I 
find that teachers are significantly less likely to communicate outside of the classroom in the first 
year of receiving tenure compared to the tenure evaluation year.  In column 4 of Table 6, I find 
that tenured teachers feel they have more job security relative to the tenure evaluation year.  
Immediately after receiving tenure, teachers are ten percent less likely to agree or strongly agree 
with the statement “I worry about the security of my job because of the performance of my 
students on state and/or local tests.”  With two or more years of tenure, teachers are fifteen 
percent less likely to agree with this statement relative to teachers in their tenure evaluation year. 
Table 7 shows the effect of tenure on extra-curricular activities outside of the classroom.  
Column 1 shows that teachers are seven percentage points less likely to serve on a school or 
district-wide committee immediately after receiving tenure.  Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 show a 
participation rate spike in coaching a sport and serving as a curriculum specialist.  Teachers who 
temporarily coach a sport (or serve as an assistant coach) for one year may not be ideal for 
student development.  In contrast to these declines, once teachers receive tenure, they are six 
percentage points more likely to sponsor a student organization, group, or club in the year 
following tenure.  Teachers who would like to sponsor a club may feel that their time is better 
spent on more visible and/or more rewarded activities during the tenure evaluation year.  Tenure 
may allow these teachers to pursue other student development activities.  This reallocation of 
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time between different extra-curricular activities may explain why tenure does not change the 
overall level of teacher work hours.  
In Table 8, I restrict the dataset to only include districts where no tenured teacher was 
fired in the previous year, but at least one teacher on probation failed to have their contract 
renewed.   This information comes from the SASS survey completed by district officials.  
District officials reported the number of probationary and tenured teachers that were fired in the 
previous academic year.  For those districts where at least one probationary teacher was fired, 
one might expect that teacher behavior around tenure would change the most (i.e. in these 
districts, the tenure process appears to be more stringent).  In these districts, I find a spike of 
$100 in personal money spent on the classroom during the tenure evaluation year – an even 
higher amount relative to the baseline estimate.  I also find that there is a reallocation of how 
elementary teachers spend their time teaching core subjects.  Because middle and high school 
teachers are usually restricted to teaching only certain subjects in which they are certificated, 
columns 2 – 4 in Table 8 is restricted to elementary teachers.  I find that immediately after 
receiving tenure, teachers spend one hour less per week teaching math, but an additional two and 
a half hours per week teaching English.  This reallocation of time may reflect a district 
superintendent’s consideration of student math scores in granting tenure.  Finally, I find that the 
stricter tenure process in these districts is reflected in teacher perceptions.  Teachers are ten 
percentage points less likely to agree or strongly agree with the following statement “If I could 
get a higher paying job I’d leave teaching as soon as possible.”   
Thirty-three states use a probationary period of three years before granting tenure, but 
seven states use a two year period and another seven states use four or five year probationary 
periods.  In Table 9, I restrict the dataset to look at each of these period lengths separately.   
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For example,  in column 2 of Table 9, where I restrict to the data to just states with two or three 
year probationary periods, I consider the two year probationary period states as the treatment 
group and three year probationary period states as the control group.  I perform this same check 
with three and four year probationary period states.  With this data restriction, I am checking to 
see if the results are robust across different probationary period lengths.   
For brevity, I provide results for work hours, classroom expenditures, committee 
participation, and coaching participation.  In two year probationary period states, there is an even 
higher decline in the amount of money spent on classroom materials once tenure is received.  
The magnitude of the result is similar to the baseline estimate when the analysis is restricted to 
the treatment group of three year probationary period states.  However, states with a four year 
probationary period length do not show a decline in personal money spent on classroom 
materials.  Results for the other outcomes of interest are similar to the baseline estimates. 
 
5.2 Threats to Identification 
The validity of the difference-in-difference estimation strategy relies on the assumption 
that trends in the treatment group would have been identical to trends in the control group in the 
absence of tenure.  There should not be changes in the schooling environment unrelated to tenure 
that modify teacher behavior in this transition time period.  That is, a trend in teacher behavior 
(measured by work hours, participation in extracurricular activities, communication levels, etc.) 
does not change trajectory as a teacher advances from the tenure evaluation year to receiving 
tenure next year.  I will present three tests to provide evidence that the trends in the treatment 
and control groups would not have changed in an environment without tenure.   
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The previous finding in column 4 of Table 3, which presents the baseline specification 
without any teacher or district controls, showed that the decline in classroom expenditures is not 
driven by changes in teacher or district characteristics.  This finding suggests that trends in 
teacher and district characteristics at the time of tenure evaluation are not experiencing a break.  
Including these characteristics in the estimating equation is done to improve efficiency, and not 
to control for confounding factors.  If the key findings only exist once these covariates are 
included, one might speculate that there are additional factors, outside of tenure, driving the 
results.    
Next, if the difference-in-difference identification strategy for teacher tenure is working 
properly, I would not expect to see any changes in teacher behavior after the transition period 
from probation to tenure.  Columns 1 - 3 in Table 10 show that there is no statistically significant 
difference in work hours, classroom expenditures, and committee participation (the same 
variables as in table 9) between the second and three years after receiving tenure.  This again 
suggests that the trends between the treatment and control groups would not have otherwise 
changed.  Note that the difference-in-difference strategy may still causally identify the effect of 
teacher tenure even if there is a change in behavior moving from year 2 to year 3.  For example, 
particularly forward-looking teachers may start to increase their teaching hours in advance of the 
tenure application process. 
In the third test for the validity of the difference-in-difference methodology, I carry out a 
placebo test where I investigate if outcomes, which should be unaffected by tenure, change as a 
result of the identification strategy.  Teachers are asked if any of the following are serious or 
moderate problems: poverty, students being unprepared, or students dropping out.  We would not 
expect the coefficients of these variables in the estimating equation to be statistically different 
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from zero as a result of tenure evaluation.  Table 11 provides confirmation of this intuition.  The 
coefficients on the dummies for Period Before Tenure Evaluation, First Year with Tenure, and 
Two or More Years with Tenure, are all statistically insignificant.  
 
6 Conclusion 
In the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly more of their 
own money on classroom materials.  Relative to the tenure evaluation year, once teachers receive 
tenure, they communicate less with students and parents outside of class and participate less in 
school and district committees.  In those districts where at least one probationary teacher is fired, 
I find that teachers reallocate their teaching time.  Immediately after receiving tenure, they spend 
less time teaching math and more time teaching English.   
This paper describes the lumpy investment behavior of teachers around the tenure 
evaluation year.  It does not make the larger and more ambitious claims about the welfare 
implications of this behavior.  While certain activities are unlikely to benefit from a spike in 
activity around the tenure evaluation year (e.g. coaching a sport likely requires several years to 
master); tenure may also grant teachers the freedom to pursue club sponsorship and other 
activities that may not have been pursued under an annual evaluation.  I also find evidence that 
the immediate drop in classroom expenditures in the first year of tenure is temporary.  Teachers 
may feel that they need to “take a break” after the tenure evaluation year, but then behavior 
reverts back to trend after a one year pause.  Those states which have eliminated tenure should 
not see swings in teacher behavior around tenure evaluation.  This consequence may make 
planning and staffing decisions easier for school district officials in these states. 
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The findings in this paper lead to interesting avenues of future research.  If teachers 
behave strategically, the next step should be to investigate the impact of tenure on student 
achievement.  If teachers spend fewer hours teaching math and invest less money in the 
classroom, does student achievement noticeably decline in a teacher’s classroom in the year 
following the receipt of tenure?  Since total works hours remain unchanged after tenure, a 
teacher’s reallocation of time towards certain extracurricular activities may also provide insight 
into the link between teacher activities and student achievement. 
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Figure 1: Personal Money Spent on Classroom Materials, SASS Data 
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Table 1: Teacher Dismissal Rates in the 2006-2007 Year, 2007-2008 SASS Data 
 
Average number of 
teachers per district 
 
Number of teachers who were 
dismissed or did not have their 
contracts renewed 
Percentage of teachers who 
were dismissed or did not have 
their contracts renewed 
    United States 211.4 4.4 2.1% 
        
Highest 5 States       
South Dakota 59.8 7.1 11.9% 
Alaska 166.1 9.6 5.8% 
Minnesota 128.8 4.8 3.7% 
Alabama 384.7 14.1 3.7% 
Oklahoma 75.7 2.7 3.6% 
        
Lowest 5 States       
Nevada 1,527.4 8.6 0.6% 
Delaware 227.5 1.2 0.5% 
Pennsylvania 180.9 0.9 0.5% 
North Dakota 46.2 0.2 0.4% 
Arkansas 123.0 0.3 0.2% 
    Note: Of the ~3,780 districts, 38% did not renew the contract of a teacher on probation.  Only 
18% of districts fired a tenured teacher for poor performance. 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS), "Public School District Data File," 2007–08. 
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Table 2: Number of Years Before a Teacher Earns Tenure, By State, 2008 
No Policy (1) 1 Year (3) 2 Years (7) 3 Years (33) 4 Years (5) 5 Years (2) 
 
DC 
 
Hawaii 
Mississippi 
N. Dakota 
 
California 
Maine 
Maryland 
Nevada 
S. Carolina 
Vermont 
Washington 
 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Louisiana 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Nebraska 
N. Hampshire 
 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
S. Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
 
Connecticut 
Illinois 
Kentucky 
Michigan 
N. Carolina 
 
Indiana 
Missouri 
Source: NCTQ State Teacher Policy Yearbook 2008 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, Data from 2007 SASS 
 
2 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
3 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
4 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
2,3, 4 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
Teacher Demographics     
Age* 42.90 42.13 41.05 42.12 
White* 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.91 
Male 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 
Teaching Year 8.27 8.46 8.75 8.47 
 
School / District Characteristics 
    
Student-Teacher Ratio* 18.00 13.76 14.70 14.56 
Expenditures per Student* $11,666 $12,327 $11,075 $12,055 
Collective Bargaining Agreement* 0.77 0.52 0.57 0.57 
 
Outcomes of Interest 
    
Work Hours 52.79 52.98 53.08 52.96 
Own Money Spent* $569.85 $391.43 $429.40 $424.85 
Professional Development 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Communication*
1
 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.83 
Would Leave for High Paying Job
2
 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.26 
Job Security
3
 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.29 
Teaching Hours 20.99 20.94 21.46 21.02 
Math Hours 5.50 5.34 5.35 5.36 
English Hours 11.64 11.14 11.44 11.27 
Coach a School Sport 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Serve as a Curriculum Specialist* 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Serve on a School or District Committee* 0.57 0.51 0.59 0.53 
Sponsor a School Club 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 
     
Total Observations 3870 20600 2790 27260 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes. 
-Variables with an ‘*’ are significantly different across states with different probationary periods. 
1) Dummy variable is defined as 1 if a teacher uses any of the following to communicate with 
parents or students outside of the regular school day: e-mail to send out group updates, e-mail to 
address individual questions or concerns, online bulletin board, course or teacher web page, 
course or teacher blog, instant messaging (IM) 
2) Teachers are asked if they agree or strongly agree with the following statement “If I could get 
a higher paying job I’d leave teaching as soon as possible.” 
3) Teachers are asked if they agree or strongly agree with the following statement “I worry about 
the security of my job because of the performance of my students on state and/or local tests. 
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Table 4: Personal Money Spent on Classroom Materials, SASS Data 
 Third Year of 
Teaching 
Fourth Year of 
Teaching 
Teaching Year 
Difference 
States with 3 Year Probation  427.32 
(25.30) 
346.65 
(21.35) 
-80.67** 
(34.15) 
States with 4 or 5 Year Probation 372.91 
(30.88) 
402.86 
(36.88) 
29.95 
(46.66) 
Probationary Period Difference -54.41 
(39.85) 
56.21 
(37.94) 
-110.62** 
(54.93) 
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Table 5: Effect of Teaching Tenure on Own Money Spent, SASS Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample Restrictions Baseline Tenure 
Evaluation Year 
Dummy 
Exclude “Before 
Tenure Evaluation” 
Dummy 
No Individual 
Teacher or District 
Controls 
Before Tenure Evaluation -71.259
**
   -70.514
**
 
 (32.295)   (31.892) 
Tenure Evaluation Year  71.259
**
   
  (32.295)   
First Year With Tenure -74.078
**
 -2.818 -72.862
*
 -61.361
**
 
 (36.687) (49.538) (38.765) (29.800) 
Two Or More Years With Tenure -35.053 36.207 -48.146 -29.647 
 (47.706) (68.561) (47.756) (44.707) 
Black -65.126
***
 -65.126
***
 -66.243
***
  
 (21.235) (21.235) (21.336)  
Hispanic 49.703
*
 49.703
*
 50.040
*
  
 (26.938) (26.938) (26.400)  
Other Race -71.556
**
 -71.556
**
 -71.282
**
  
 (34.419) (34.419) (34.413)  
Male -99.378
***
 -99.378
***
 -99.076
***
  
 (14.678) (14.678) (14.628)  
Age 3.785
***
 3.785
***
 3.784
***
  
 (1.016) (1.016) (1.016)  
Student-Teacher Ratio -3.560
**
 -3.560
**
 -3.550
**
  
 (1.595) (1.595) (1.585)  
Expenditures Per Student -1.604 -1.604 -1.715  
 (1.493) (1.493) (1.487)  
Collective Bargaining 20.447 20.447 19.575  
 (20.512) (20.512) (20.671)  
R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.035 
Observations  14280 14280 14280 14770 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
Note 2: An additional robustness check was performed by dropping IA and NM from the 
regression.  The results are nearly identical in magnitude and significance.    
Note 3: I cannot reject the hypothesis that “First Year With Tenure” is equal to “Two Or More 
Years With Tenure” for any of the outcomes 
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Table 6: Estimates of Teacher Tenure on Effort Outcomes, SASS Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Work Hours Professional 
Development 
Communication Job Security 
Before Tenure Evaluation 0.369 -0.006 -0.029 0.021 
 (0.593) (0.005) (0.024) (0.031) 
First Year With Tenure 0.590 -0.010
*
 -0.040
**
 -0.032
*
 
 (0.455) (0.006) (0.018) (0.019) 
Two Or More Years With Tenure 0.153 -0.005 -0.042 -0.047
**
 
 (0.981) (0.006) (0.033) (0.022) 
Black -0.660 -0.001 -0.124
***
 0.031 
 (0.558) (0.004) (0.032) (0.041) 
Hispanic -0.100 0.004 -0.100
***
 0.113
***
 
 (0.259) (0.006) (0.027) (0.012) 
Other Race -0.854 0.000 -0.088
***
 0.022 
 (0.518) (0.005) (0.027) (0.041) 
Male 0.841
*
 -0.017
***
 0.030
***
 -0.020 
 (0.436) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) 
Age -0.004 0.000
**
 -0.002
***
 0.003
***
 
 (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.048 -0.001
*
 0.009
***
 -0.002 
 (0.036) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) 
Expenditures Per Student 0.036 0.000 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) 
Collective Bargaining -0.091 -0.000 -0.027 -0.002 
 (0.354) (0.003) (0.027) (0.019) 
R-squared 0.027 0.016 0.069 0.024 
Observations  14280 14280 14280 14280 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
Note 2: I cannot reject the hypothesis that “First Year With Tenure” is equal to “Two Or More 
Years With Tenure” for any of the outcomes 
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Table 7: Estimates of Teacher Tenure on Extracurricular Activities, SASS Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Committee Curriculum Coach Sponsor 
Before Tenure Evaluation -0.004 -0.039
***
 -0.039
***
 -0.030 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.012) (0.023) 
First Year With Tenure -0.066
**
 -0.029
*
 -0.029
*
 0.059
**
 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.016) (0.028) 
Two Or More Years With Tenure -0.080
*
 -0.013 -0.004 0.049 
 (0.046) (0.017) (0.024) (0.031) 
Black -0.050 -0.015 0.016 0.073
***
 
 (0.030) (0.015) (0.019) (0.027) 
Hispanic -0.154
***
 -0.011 -0.019 -0.087
***
 
 (0.046) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) 
Other Race -0.145
***
 0.053
**
 -0.044
*
 -0.000 
 (0.046) (0.021) (0.025) (0.032) 
Male -0.088
***
 0.001 0.343
***
 0.128
***
 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015) 
Age -0.000 0.002
***
 -0.006
***
 -0.003
***
 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.009
***
 -0.001 0.003
**
 0.007
***
 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Expenditures Per Student -0.003
*
 0.004
***
 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Collective Bargaining -0.001 0.006 -0.030
**
 -0.022 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) 
R-squared 0.054 0.031 0.182 0.039 
Observations  14280 14280 14280 14280 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
Note 2: I cannot reject the hypothesis that “First Year With Tenure” is equal to “Two Or More 
Years With Tenure” for any of the outcomes 
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Table 8: Estimates of Teacher Tenure in Districts which Fire Probationary Teachers, SASS Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Own Money Spent Math Hours English Hours Leave for High 
Paying Job 
Before Tenure Evaluation -99.258
*
 -0.042 -0.244 0.005 
 (52.860) (0.291) (0.912) (0.046) 
First Year With Tenure -105.051 -1.007
*
 2.580
**
 -0.095
**
 
 (64.565) (0.579) (1.062) (0.037) 
Two Or More Years With Tenure -60.769 -0.931 3.977
**
 -0.091 
 (125.963) (0.836) (1.650) (0.061) 
Black -57.906
*
 0.366 -0.825 0.107
**
 
 (31.125) (0.461) (0.550) (0.047) 
Hispanic 113.051
*
 0.318 1.218
**
 0.095 
 (57.036) (0.207) (0.533) (0.088) 
Other Race -40.729 -0.611 -1.361 0.066 
 (61.958) (0.501) (0.906) (0.083) 
Male -128.006
***
 0.064 -0.457 0.094
***
 
 (20.785) (0.274) (0.540) (0.022) 
Age 2.778
***
 -0.011 0.016 0.001 
 (0.789) (0.014) (0.024) (0.001) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -4.526
*
 0.060 -0.058 -0.002 
 (2.269) (0.050) (0.044) (0.003) 
Expenditures Per Student -5.465 -0.016 0.159
**
 -0.002 
 (5.554) (0.042) (0.075) (0.004) 
Collective Bargaining 19.206 0.223 -0.249 -0.029 
 (33.913) (0.257) (0.574) (0.040) 
R-squared 0.062 0.050 0.073 0.042 
Observations  4620 1530 1530 4620 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
Note 2: I cannot reject the hypothesis that “First Year With Tenure” is equal to “Two Or More 
Years With Tenure” for any of the outcomes 
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Table 9: Estimates of Teacher Tenure by Probationary Period, SASS Data, Robustness Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample Restrictions Baseline 2 or 3 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
3 or 4 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
4 or 5 Year 
Probationary 
Period States 
Effect on Work Hours     
     Before Tenure Evaluation 0.369 0.565 0.788 1.867 
 (0.593) (0.671) (1.142) (1.629) 
     First Year With Tenure 0.590 -0.428 1.988
**
 -0.451 
 (0.455) (0.636) (0.829) (1.197) 
     Two Or More Years With Tenure 0.153 -2.605
**
 2.978
*
 1.782 
 (0.981) (1.288) (1.671) (1.777) 
Effect on Own Money Spent     
     Before Tenure Evaluation -71.259
**
 -56.626 -79.773 -96.186 
 (32.295) (44.509) (57.464) (71.627) 
     First Year With Tenure -74.078
**
 -127.090
**
 -63.561 76.740 
 (36.687) (50.844) (54.605) (63.402) 
     Two Or More Years With Tenure -35.053 -80.430 -66.394 82.356 
 (47.706) (77.656) (90.197) (126.779) 
Effect on Committee Participation     
     Before Tenure Evaluation -0.004 -0.032 0.047 -0.141
**
 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.045) (0.048) 
     First Year With Tenure -0.066
**
 0.022 -0.137
***
 -0.167 
 (0.033) (0.045) (0.038) (0.098) 
     Two Or More Years With Tenure -0.080
*
 0.102
**
 -0.187
***
 -0.223 
 (0.046) (0.039) (0.061) (0.212) 
Effect on Coaching Participation     
     Before Tenure Evaluation -0.039
***
 -0.042
*
 -0.035
***
 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.045) 
     First Year With Tenure -0.029
*
 -0.035 -0.004 -0.060
***
 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.040) (0.015) 
     Two Or More Years With Tenure -0.004 0.019 -0.028 -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.059) (0.056) 
 
All covariates in eq. 1 are also included 
    
R-squared 0.049 0.053 0.039 0.065 
Observations  14280 9970 10720 2160 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.   
Because of the small number of states, clustering by state may generate high Type 1 error rates. 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 10: Falsification Test, Change in Dependent Variable Between 2 and 3 Years After 
Tenure, SASS Data  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Work Hours Own Money 
Spent 
Committee Coach 
3 Years After Tenure 0.566 48.200 -0.006 0.012 
 (1.219) (73.804) (0.025) (0.025) 
Black 1.221 -32.193 -0.094 0.012 
 (2.261) (41.695) (0.058) (0.039) 
Hispanic -0.322 37.109 -0.197
**
 -0.049 
 (0.485) (51.394) (0.076) (0.029) 
Other Race -1.012 1.514 0.003 -0.131
**
 
 (0.672) (50.860) (0.117) (0.054) 
Male 0.940
*
 -48.047
**
 -0.105
***
 0.367
***
 
 (0.496) (20.772) (0.022) (0.029) 
Age 0.071
**
 4.928
***
 -0.000 -0.007
***
 
 (0.030) (1.730) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.173
**
 -2.281 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.067) (1.797) (0.006) (0.002) 
Expenditures Per Student -0.040 -2.133 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.032) (3.219) (0.008) (0.002) 
Collective Bargaining -1.384
*
 -2.505 -0.127
***
 -0.010 
 (0.781) (29.281) (0.037) (0.033) 
R-squared 0.058 0.048 0.085 0.228 
Observations  3810 3810 2770 2770 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 11: Falsification Test, Effect of Teacher Tenure on Perceptions of Students, SASS Data  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable
1
 Poverty Students 
Unprepared 
Students 
Dropping Out 
Before Tenure Evaluation 0.012 0.015 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.028) 
First Year With Tenure 0.005 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.021) 
Two Or More Years With Tenure -0.000 -0.002 -0.024 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) 
Black -0.050
**
 -0.040
**
 -0.043
**
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Hispanic -0.078
**
 -0.067
***
 -0.069
***
 
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) 
Other Race -0.046 0.014 -0.085
***
 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.026) 
Male -0.013 -0.025
***
 -0.196
***
 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
Age -0.001 -0.001
*
 -0.001
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.005
**
 -0.002 -0.017
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Expenditures Per Student 0.005
*
 0.001 -0.003
*
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Collective Bargaining -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) 
R-squared 0.043 0.025 0.063 
Observations  14280 14280 14280 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state 
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
1) Teachers are asked if any of the following are serious or moderate problems. 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Appendix – Data Sources 
NCTQ 
Details on state tenure laws come from the 2008 National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) 
State Teacher Policy Yearbook.  In the yearbook, NCTQ publishes each state’s probationary 
period before a teacher may be granted tenure, as well as a citation for the relevant state law.   
SASS 
Data on teacher behavior and time allocation comes from the restricted-use version of the 2007-
2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics.  The sample is restricted to public school teachers only.  Teachers from career or 
vocational schools, alternative schools, and special education schools were also removed from 
the sample.   
